

EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF STATE
HULL GIVEN BEFORE THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

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I. BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United States.

A. Japan's Record of Aggression:

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandisement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China on which the Nine Power Treaty rested.

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo". By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. On April 17, 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed.

On December 29, 1934 Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion in China.

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1936, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937

Italy adhered. While the Pact was ostensibly for self-protection against communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations -- the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis".

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937.

On December 12, 1937 Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as "the new order in Greater East Asia" and "the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development.

In August and September 1940 Japan with German assistance extorted an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indochina.

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone.

On October 4, 1940 Premier Konoe was quoted by the press as a statement on the Tripartite Pact as having said in part:

"If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts ... those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic manoeuvres to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime

B. Japan's Record of Duplicity:

The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands."

In 1918, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, said "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of East Asia," Japanese forces for four years had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.

On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy..." Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.

On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development ... that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies". Following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a Commercial Commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Japanese colony.

After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assurances...

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Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

C. Divergence between Japanese
and American Policies:

The President and I have very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies.

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course of aggression, expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever widening conflict between force of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace. Our Government's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1935, and in a further communication of February 25, 1935, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.

On January 17, 1933 the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, made clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international

treaties by writing out, in reply to a question, a statement as follows:

"I am ... wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."

In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

Thus in 1931-1933, while Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1934 I had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saito, one of many conversations in which I endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories.

On June 12, 1936 in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, I told the Ambassador that the impression of the American people was that Japan sought economic domination first of eastern Asia and then of other areas such as it might select, and that this would ultimately mean political as well as military domination. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its associating itself in a peaceful and constructive program.

Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes.

In a further statement of August 23, 1937, I applied the principles of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated that the issues, in that situation, of concern to the United States went far beyond the immediate question of the protection of American nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part of the world were of concern to all nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities.

On October 6, 1937 the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In November 1937 the United States participated with eighteen other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings.

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On April 15, 1940 the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. On April 17 I took cognizance of that statement. I pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. I urged that peaceful principles be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world.

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During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind--and I was explaining to members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came in contact--that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force, in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

I was saying to these Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects.

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The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when on January 6, 1941 in his address to Congress he declared that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today". The President said that the whole pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the march threatening other nations, great and small.

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On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, I said:

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region."

I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere".

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II. CONVERSATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO JULY 1941.

On February 14, 1941 the President received the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned Japanese movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agreement. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations.

On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims.

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion.

On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

- (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
- (2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
- (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
- (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the

Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with these principles.

On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to his Government; that normal trade relations between the United States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources--such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel--in the southwest Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guarantee of independence of the Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

The proposal also contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted.

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against Communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia.

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gauge settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood.

On May 14, Mr. Matsuka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both Prince Kono and he were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means, "unless," he added significantly, "circumstances render this impossible."

In reply to the Ambassador's inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind, Mr. Matsuoka referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When the Ambassador pointed out that such measures were of a defensive character, the Minister's reply was that these measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Government to act.

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and in a radio address on the same day he declared that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. He warned of the conditions which would exist should Hitler be victorious.

The President and I were sure that the proclamation would be noticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords.

On May 28 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had it in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any negotiations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals.

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points--the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of non-discrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles.

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二〇〇七B

真珠湾攻撃を審査する對英議會議員委員會，
前二行ハタルハル國務長官，證言抜萃

一〇六—一〇三頁

一 一九四一年／昭和十六年／會議背景

會議ニ對スル日本，提議ハ極東ニ関スル日米間，協定，締結，
指向セシテ居タ。其ハ一九四一年／昭和十六年，初期ニ提起セシタ。
此ノ提議ヲ受諾スル拒否スル前ニ大統領ト余ハ此問題ニ関シ
日本ノ國際的侵略ノ記録，日本ノ國際的行動ニ於ケル二重性
ノ記録，日本ト合衆國ニ依リテ傳統的ニ又現在遂行セシテ
居ル兩國政策，確然タル相違及極東，歐洲，並ニ合衆國
ニ於ケル現情勢等ノ原因ノ背景ニ對シ，十分ノ考慮ヲ拂フ。

A 日本ノ侵略記録

大統領及余ハ日本ノ過去ノ侵略的記録ト同時代ニ極東ニ
於ケル発展的傾向ヲ念頭ニ置キト共ニ又之ヲ考慮スルニ
レバナラナカシタ。

日本ノ近代的国家トシテ發生シタ殆ト最初ノ軍事擴張
政策ヲ續行シタキタ。穩健派勢力ヲ得テ或短期間ヲ除キ

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其ノ大部分、期間中一侵略階段ト次ノ階段ト、中間期間ハ
早ニ戦争國整理ノ期間タルニ過ぎ去リタ。

一八九五年(明治廿八年)日本ハ支那ニ對スル戦争ニ成功シテ後
台灣ヲ併合シ高滿洲ニ於テ足場ヲ建設シヨウトシカ之ハ失敗
シタ。

一九〇五年(明治卅八年)日露戦争ノ後日本ハ關東州ニ對シ租
借權ヲ獲得シ南滿洲鐵道ヲ領有シテ滿洲ニ確チ地盤
ヲ築キタ。同時ニ日本ハ南樺太ヲ獲得シタ。

一九一〇年(明治四十三年)日本ハ多年、侵襲、後壓迫ト陰謀ニヨリ
朝鮮ヲ併合シタ。

一九一五年(大正四年)日本ハ歐洲、聯合國ニ對シ獨断戦争ニ夢中
ニツキタルヲ利用シ、カ、無名ノ「二十一點」ノ要求ヲ中國ニ突き
ツタ。第一次世界大戰、終末ニ於テ日本ハ一九二一—二二年(在
十年—十一年)、華盛頓會議ニ參加シ、同會議ニ於テ締結セリ
諸條約、調印國トシタ。是等、條約中ニハ中國ニ對スル原則
及政策ニ關連シ有ル九ヶ國條約ヲ包含セリト居タ、コ、條約ハ
中國ノ實力ナル安定シタ政府ヲ養成シ且維持スル為メ充分具
最モ無障害、機會ヲ與ヘル狀態ヲ創造セリトモ期待シタ。

日本ハ九ヶ國條約ノ基礎ヲ置クトシ、中國ニ對スル國制的政策ヲ
誓約シタ。然レモ一九二七年(昭和二年)田中内閣出現後、日本ハ
一九二八年(昭和三年)ニハ中國ニ對シ所謂「積極政策」ヲ採用シ
「政策」下ニ益々中國ノ内政ニ干渉スル傾向ヲ表シタ。

一九三二年(昭和六年)日本ハ滿洲ヲ侵略シ其地ヲ滿洲國、
名稱ノモトニ之ヲ統治スル傀儡政府ヲ樹立シタ。九ヶ國條約、

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極度之違背デアルコ、行爲ニヨリ日本ハ華盛頓會議ノ諸條約ニ協定シテ協力政策ヲ完全ニ破棄シタリタル。

一九三四年(昭和九年)、始メ日本、外務大臣廣田氏ニヨリ覺書、形式ニ(一九三四年二月二十日附)日本政府ハ接近シタリト如何ニ余ガ歡迎シタカラ想ヒ出ヌ。コノ覺書ニ廣田氏ハ力合衆國ト日本ト、向ニ「友誼的解決」根本的ニ不可能問題ハ存在シタリト確信スルと言ハタ、余ハコレニ對スル回答(一九三四年三月三日附)ニ於テ廣田氏、意見ニ賛同シ、且我ガ政府ハ平和的方法ヨリ諸問題、調整ヲ確信スルコトヲ強調シタ。

然ルニコノ覺書ヨリ交換シテ聞モテク日本ハ再び國內強力ナル政策樹立者達ガ終始一貫固執スル侵略、根本目的ノ暴露シタ。

一九三四年四月十七日、日本外務省、代辯者ハカ、「支那二年ヲ出スベリ」ニ聲明トシテ然ラセタルコ、野蠻的公然聲明ヲナシタ。コノ聲明ニ於テ日本ハ中國ヲシテ日本、指圖ニ從フコトヲ強制シ且日本ガ許容スル場合ニ限り他、國ト中國ト、交渉ヲ許スト言フ目的ヲ明カニシタ。

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一九三四年/昭和九年/十二月二十九日、日本、一九三六年/昭和十一年/末、

一九三三年/大正十三年/二月六日「ワシントン」に於て調印セラル

海軍制限條約より脱退スル意圖を公式に通告シタ。

其、通告、征服、行程、尙、明瞭且、意議セル動キアリ。

其、通告、提出次、日本、中國侵略、開始ヲ志シテ、其、軍備
増強ニ邁進シタ。

其頃日本、ソ、獨逸、會談ニ入り、ソ、結果、

一九三六年/昭和十一年/十月二十五日、防共協定が兩國より締結セラル。

一九三七年/昭和十二年/伊太利が調印シタ。同協定、表面上、共產

主義ニ對スル自己防衛デアルガ、實際、其、後、匪賊國家ニ依

ル武力的發展、手段、爲、準備工作——所謂「起軸」、創造、

第一歩——デアル。

一九三七年/昭和十二年/七月、日本、北京附近、一地点ニ於テ中國軍隊

ト日本軍隊、間、起ラ、小サ、事件ヲ故意ニ利用シ、大規模中國侵略

ヲ非道ニ開始シタ。日本、尤、大、軍隊ヲ中國ニ注ギ込ミ、ソ、レ、ハ、

産業其他、重要中心地ヲ含ミ、廣大、地域ニ扇狀ニ擴ガリタ。且、寧

ノ軍隊、凌辱、掠奪、殺人其他凡テ不法行為ヲ犯シタ。特ニ野蠻

タリタ、ハ、一九三七年/昭和十二年/十二月十三日日本軍隊、南京占領ニ次

チ行ハ、同市ニ於テ暴虐ヲシタ。

一九三八年/昭和十三年/十二月十日、日本航空機、揚子江ニ於テ、合衆國軍艦

「ネー」ヲ爆撃シ、之ヲ撃沈シタ。

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軍事的发展、計画ニテ、日本ニ於テ國民ノ支持ヲ得ルヲ爲メ「東亞新秩序」
又「東亞共榮圈」ト云フヤラテ標語ガ用ニシタ。合衆國其他ノ國ハ日本ノ
發展ヲ抑圧シテ居ルトイフ非難ヲ受ケタ。

一九四〇年、昭和十五年八月及九月ニ、日本ハ獨逸後助ト「ドイツ」
佛蘭西ト協定ヲ無理ニ結ビ、其協定ノ下ニ日本軍隊ハ北部印度支那
ニ進入シタ。

一九四〇年、昭和十五年九月、日本ハ獨逸及ヒ伊太利ト三國同盟ヲ
締結シタ。右同盟ハ直ニ合衆國ヲ目的トシモテアル。ソレハ日本ハ獨
逸兩國ガ馬細亞及ヒ波羅巴征服、計畫ヲ完了シテ兩國ガ獨立ハ合衆國
ニ立ケ向フニトが出来ルニテハ、合衆國ガ充分ナル自衛ヲ毀ラサル事ヲ妨グル
爲メ合衆國サレドモアリ。

一九四〇年、昭和十五年十月四日ニ近衛首相ハ三國同盟ニ関スル聲明中ノ
一部ニ次ノ如ク言フ新聞ニ言カリタ。

『合衆國ガ日本獨逸及ヒ伊太利、眞意ヲ理解スルコトヲ拒否シ、執拗
ニ挑戰的態度及ヒ行爲ヲ續ケルニ於テハ、……是等諸國ハ戰ハサルヲ得
ナクハテマシ。日本ハ日下日露ノ政治及ヒ經濟關係ヲ調整スルヲ努力シ
居リ、又日本ハ露西亞トノ間ノ摩擦ヲ減ズルヲ凡テ努力ヲ爲スベシトイフ。
日本ハ今露西亞英國及ヒ合衆國ガ彼等ノ將政權後助行動ヲ中止
スル様彼等ヲ諒導スルタメ外交工作ヲ行フニ居ル』

No. 5

B. 日本、表裏的言動、記録

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大統領ト余ト亦日本ノ國際關係ニ於テ表裏的言動ヲ爲シ其記録ヲ有スル事實ヲ考ヘタ。コノ表裏的言動ハ日本軍部が彼自身ノ法律テアリ日本ノ文官が約束シタ事ヲ終始一貫シテ蹂躪シタ事ト云フ事實ニ大ニ起因スルモノデアル。

Doc

一九〇四年(明治三十七年)日本ハ朝鮮、獨立ト其、領土保全トヲ保證シタ。一九〇五年(明治三十八年)ニ日本ハ朝鮮ヲ併合シタ。

一九〇八年(明治四十一年)日本ハ「アメリカ」合衆國ト共ニ中國、獨立保全及ニ中國ニ於ケル機會均等、原則ヲ支持スルコトヲ誓約シタ。

一九一五年(大正四年)ニ日本ハ「二十一条」箇條、要求「中國」ニ突き付ケタ。

一九一八年(大正七年)ニ日本ハ露西亞軍が其、後必要トスルカモ知レヌ軍需品ヲ保護スル爲、露西亞人自身、自衛機關、組織ヲ援助スル爲、及ビ「シベリア」ニ於ケル「チユツコスロキヤ」軍、撤退ヲ救援スル爲、各國ハ夫々七千人ヲ超ヘザル兵力ヲ「シベリア」ニ派遣スルト言フ聯合國間、取極メニ参加シタ。日本軍部ハコノ事業ニ東部「シベリア」併合、好機アリト見テ(結局成功シタカッタガ)七万人以上、兵力ヲ派遣シタ。

No. 6

一九二二年(大正十一年)ドノ九ヶ國條約ニ於テ日本ハ中國、主權、獨立、及ニ領土的行政的保全ヲ尊重スルコトニ同意シタ。日本、亦中國ニ於ケル機會均等、原則ヲ樹立スルコトニ盡カスルコトニ同意シタ。一九三三年(昭和六年)以降中國ニ於ケル日本、軍事的占領及經濟的支配、全課程、是等、誓約侵犯デアリタ。

一九三三年(昭和七年)十一月二十日、當時國際聯盟へ派遣、日本代表

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多松岡氏「我々以上、領土ヲ欲セズ」ト言フ。一九三三年(昭和八年)、末迄ニ日本軍ハ滿洲全土ヲ占領シ、其後、歲月ニハ南方及西方ニ行動シテ廣大ナル中國、地域ヲ占領スルニ至リ。

一九三七年(昭和十二年)六月二十七日、當時、日本首相近衛公爵ハ「北支ハ、軍隊派遣ニ當ツテハ、政府ハ、最近、ソノ聲明ニモ述ベテ如ク東亞、平和維持以外勿論何等、目的モ有スルモノデハナイ」ト述ベテナル。「東亞、平和ヲ維持」スルヲ日本軍ハ四年ニ亘ッテ中國大部分、地域ニ戰爭ト苦難ヲ齎シ。

一九三七年(昭和十二年)十月十六日、日本外務省ハ「日本ハ決シテ中國民衆ニ敵ト視ルモノデハナイ……」ト述ベテナル。日本ハ中國ニ對スルノ感情ヲ一般中國民衆ヲ爆撃シ中國、諸都市ヲ燒キ幾百萬ノ中國人ノ家ヲ奪ヒ生計、道ヲ絶テ一般人ヲ虐待殺戮スルコトニ依ツテ又恐怖、慘虐、行為ニ依ツテ示シ。

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)四月十五日、當時、日本外相有田氏ハ「日本政府ハ蘭領東印度、現状ニ影響ヲ及ボスベキ如何ナル進展……ニ對シテモ深ク憂慮セザルヲ得ナイ」ト述ベテ、ソノ春、独逸ニヨル和蘭陀ヲ領ニ次イテ日本ハ商業使節團ヲ蘭印ニ送り、若シソノ場合ハ蘭印ヲミテ實際上日本ハ一殖民地トラレルガ如キ讓歩ヲ要求シ。

一九三七年(昭和十二年)七月中國ニ對シテ日本、宣戰、布告ナキ戰爭勃發後モ、日本ハ民間指導者達ハ「アムリカ」權利ハ尊重サルベキ旨屢々保證シ。日本陸軍ハ屢々「保證ニ違背

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スル行動ニ由ル。

自 一〇八四頁一〇八六頁

日本ハ屢々中國ニ於ケルアメリカ人、生命及ビ財産ハ尊重サルベキ旨保證シタ。

シカモアメリカ人、生命、損失ト危險ヲ伴フアメリカ財産爆撃事件ハ確實ニ増加スル數ヲ以テ報告セラレツ、アツタ。

日本ハ屢々中國ニ於ケルアメリカノ條約上、權利ハ尊重サルベキ旨保證シタ。コレヲ、權利ヲ侵犯スル無數ノ措置ハ日本占領地域ニ於テ實施セラレタ。通商独占ガ行ハレ差別的ノ稅ヲ課セシ、アメリカ財産ガ差押ヘラレタ等々。加フルニアメリカ人ハ襲撃サレ、不法ニ抑留サレ侮辱ヲ受ケタ。

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C. 日本、政策ト米國、政策ト、相違

米國ト日本トハ非常ニ懸隔セル概念ト政策ト有スルヲ實
ヲ大統領ト余ハ深ク念頭ニ置キテ居ク。吾々ハ我が政府ガ
日本ヲミテ平和的政策ヲ採ルヤウニ任向ケル爲ニ順次採リ来
ツテ手段ヲ検討シク。
吾々ハ一九三一年(昭和六年)ニ日本ガ武力ト條約無視トニミ
侵略及擴張ノ行動ニ衆出シク行動ハ侵略的勢力ト平和
維持ノ希望若ト、同ニ益々大ナル衝突、先驅ヲ爲シタモ、
「アハコトヲ思」に出シク。滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ行動ニ對スル我が
政府、反對ハ一九三三年(昭和七年)一月七日附當時ノ國務
長官スナムソン氏ヨリ日本政府宛ノ通達及一九三五年
(昭和十年)三月二十五日附國際聯盟事務局長宛ノ
通達ニモ述ベラレタ。

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一九三三年ノ昭和八年ノ一月十日選出大統領ルーズヴェルト氏、或る質問ニ對スル回答トシテ、次ノ如キ声明書ヲ出スコトニ依ツテ彼ノ國際條約神聖原則ヲ支持ヲ明カニシタ。

「余ハ、アメリカノ外交政策ハ國際條約ノ神聖ヲ支持セネバナラヌトイフコトヲ以テ進ンデ明カニスル。コレコソ國家間ノ凡テノ關係ガ依ツテ以テ立ツベキ礎石ナル。」

ルーズヴェルト大統領ハ一九三三年三月四日、最初ノ就任演説ニ於テ彼ノ世界政策ノ領野ニ於テ「國ヲ善隣政策」ニ断乎トシテ自己ヲ尊重スルソレガ故ニ他ノ權利ヲモ尊重スル隣人——自己ノ義務ヲ尊重シ隣人ノ世界ニ於ケル又ハソレトノ間、彼ノ協定ノ神聖ヲ尊重スル隣人——ニ捧ゲルコトヲ述ベタ。

カクシテ一九三一年ノ昭和六年ノヨリ一九三三年ノ昭和八年ノ三旦ツテ日本ガソノ侵略計畫ヲ進メツツアツタ時、アメリカ政府ハ條約ト平和的方法ノ神聖ヲ世界的ニ支持スルコトヲ提唱シテ着實ニ前進シツツアツタナル。

一九三四年五月十六日余ハ日本大使齊藤ト一般の會談ヲ行フソレハ余ガ日本側ニ彼等ノ最大ノ利益ハ平和政策ニ從フコトナルコトヲ説得シヤウト努メタシ、タリ、會談ノツデアツタ。

No. 10

三日後ニ余ハ再ビ日本大使ト會談シタ。會談中大使ハ日本政府ガ日本ハ東亞ノ平和維持ニ因テ侵犯セル特殊ノ任務ヲ持ツキ本トイフ趣旨ヲ數週間ニ亘リ公ニ提唱シテ居タ

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常套語ヲ繰返シタリ。近隣諸國ト領土ニ對シ西霸權ヲ振、
ントスルハ日本側ノ意圖デアルトイフ意味ガ明瞭ニ日本側、
常套語ニ含マシテ居ルコトニ日本大使、注意ヲ喚起シタリ。

昭和十年六月十二日駐英日本大使ト、會談、際日本ハ
東亞ヲ始メ次イデリノ外ニ好ム地域ニ對シ經濟的支配ヲ及
ボサントシテ然レテ以上ハ結局軍事的支配、ニ至リタリ
政治的支配ヲモ意味スルトイフハ米國市民、受ケタ印象
デアルトイフタリ。余ハ大使ニ平和的且建設的計畫ニ自ら覺
シムル日本ニ利益ナル所ヲ以テ力ヲ説キタリ。

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我々、凡そ説得や努力を怠らざりし日本（一九三七年七月
支那侵略を開始シタリ）七月十六日合衆國政府、平和的立場
支持ニ對シ凡そ國々糾合セシる國際的政策、根本原則ニ關スル
聲明書ヲ出シタリ。

更一九三七年八月二十三日、聲明書ニ於テ七月十六日、聲明
書、原則ヲ明白ニ支那ニ於ケル事態ニ適用シタリ。
余ハ、之ヲ變ニ當リ、合衆國ガ因ニ不論爭矣、米國國民並
ニ米國利権ノ保護ト云フ自下、問題ヨリ遙ク以上モバナルト述ベタリ。
重大ノ戰鬪狀態、世界、如何ナル部ニ於テモ凡そ國家、因
ハテテアリ。故ニ余、中國並ニ日本兩政府ニ對シ敵對行為ヲ
制止スルヲ勸告シタリ。

一九三七年昭和十二年十月六日米國政府、支那ニ於ケル日本、
行動ハ國家同、關係ヲ律スベキ原則ニ合致セズ又九ヶ國條
約及テリテニテロク、協定、規定ニ背リモ、ナリトテ聲明シタリ。
一九三七年十月、合衆國、他十六ヶ國ト共ニ極東ニ蔓延スル
遺憾ナル鬪争、終熄ヲ促進スル平和的手段ヲ研究スルタリ。
アラスカニ於テ開催カレタル會議ニ參加シタリ。右會議ハ
一九二二年、九ヶ國條約、規定ニ從ヒ開催カレタリ。右會議ニ
加ヘタル日本政府再ニ拒否、調停ト和解ニ依リ鬪争

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終見、飛蘭ヲサントスル努力ヲ予實上阻害シタ。十一月二十四日會議
シ、開會ヲ停止シタ。

一九四十年／昭和十五年／四月十五日日本外相、南洋
地域ヲ飛蘭領東印度日本支配ヲ擴張セシムル根本目的ヲ顯
ス聲明ヲ發表シタ。四月十七日ニ余、其ノ聲明ヲ知リタ。余、國際間
係ニ於テ飛蘭領印度、重西性ヲ指摘シタ。

余、平和的方該ニ僞以外ニ飛蘭印、内政問題ニ干渉シ又其ノ現狀
ヲ變更セシムルコトハ飛蘭印、地域於ケルニミナラズ全太平洋地域ニ於
テ安定平和及び安全ノタメ有言ナル可キヲ述ベリ。余、平和
諸原則ガ太平洋、各域ニ於テノミナラズ世界、各域ニモ適用セラル
可キヲ主張シタノデアリ。

一九四十年／昭和十五年冬カラ一九四一年／昭和十六年
春カラ余、日本軍部、指導者達ヲ布哇、數百哩西方ヨリ南
洋及印度ニ亘ル全太平洋地域征服ノ使命ニ發足シツル様
樣ヲテフルコトヲハニ銘記シ且其旨國會議員及余ヲ接觸シ
其、他、米人説明シテ居タ。日本人、世界新秩序ヲ建設スル
爲メニソート合作ヲ武力ヲ以テ立ツタ而シテ彼等、彼等が自己
ノモト僞稱スル世界ノ半分ニ於ケル新秩序ノ下ニ全平和的國家
ヲ参加セシムル力ヲ持ツト思ヒタ。

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余ハ一九三三年、昭和八年、カラ余が對日關係ヲ解決スルタメ、
組織的且堅実ニシテ眞摯ナル努力ヲ開始シテナクツトテ又
等、米人ニ語シテ居タ。余ハ日本人ニ接近シ此、征服、行動ヲヤメル
様ニ彼等ヲ説服スル何等カノ方途ヲ見出スコトガ人智ニ出来得
ルコトカ否カヲ知ラウト試ミテ居タ。我々ハ日本人ニ對シテ政治
經濟及び社會的見地カラ彼等自身ノ將來ヲ考慮スル様強調
シテ居タリテアル。

大統領が千九百四十一年、昭和十六年、一月六日議會ニ對スル彼ノ演
說中、英國ノ安全が今日程外部ヨリ由々シク脅威ヲ受ケタコト
ハ言フ無キト公言シタ時彼ハ極東ノ情勢ニ着眼シテナク。大統領
領ハ民主主義的生命ノ全型式が慍々程々數ノ獨立國家ニ
於テ抹殺サレタ而シテ侵略者ハ他、大小諸國家ヲ脅カシテ更
ラニ行進ヲ續ケテ居ルト述ベタ。

千九百四十一年、昭和十六年、一月十五日下院、外交委員會ニ提出
ノ武庫代價與法安未ヲ支持スル陳述中余ハ左ノ如ク述ベタ。

「日本が西太平洋ノ全域ニ於テ支配的ノ地位ニ自己ヲ確立セントス
ル廣汎ニシテ霸氣滿々タル計畫ニ依ツテ最初カラ活動シ来レル
トハ終始一貫シテ明白ナル。日本ノ指導者達ハ武力ニ依リ其ノ
地位ヲ獲得維持シ斯クテ自己ヲ世界全人口ノ約二分一ヲ含
ム地域ノ支配者ヲラシメントスル彼等ノ決意ヲ公然ト宣言シタ。
其ノ結果トシテ彼等ハ其ノ地域ニ於ケル海上航路及び通商路ノ專
斷的支配ヲ獲得スルコトニテアルコトヲ口ウ」

余ハ着々トシテ擴大スル征服ノ組織的殘忍且ツ執拗ナル行動
ニ人類が直面シテ居ルコト並ニ法ヲ遵守スル諸國家ニ依ル公海
ノ支配が西半球ノ安全ノ鍵ニアルコトヲ指摘シタ。

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自一〇三頁至一〇九頁

二一九四二年／昭和十六年／七月以前、会談及び展開

一九四二年／昭和十六年／三月十四日大統領、新日本大使野村大將
ヲ哀心ヲリ喜じ迎へ二人ハ率直ニ語り合つことが出来たと云ひ
マシタ。彼ハ日米間ノ関係が悪化シツアルコトヲ指摘シ日本ノ
南進ヤ三國同盟加入ニ云及シマシタ。大統領ハ大使が國務長
官ト日米関係ノ重大局面ヲ再検討シ率直ニ協議スルが望ミシイ
コトヲアルト申シマシタ。

三月八日日本大使ト、最初ノ長時間、会談ニ於テ余ハドイツ
及び日本が身勝手ニ太平洋及び諸大陸ヲ支配セシメテ進軍
シ且犧牲者達、アラユル幸福ヲ無ニシテ利益ヲ得ントスル活動
ニ對シ米國民ハコトモナク激昂シタルトイフコトヲ強調シマシタ。
三月十四日日本大使ハ大統領ト私ニ會見シマシタ。大統領ハ我々
ニ國同ノ問題ヲ武力的ニ衝突スルコトナシニ解決出来ルト言フ
大使、暗示ニ頷成シ先ツオノ年順ハ日本ノ意図ニ因スル疑惑
ヲ除去スルコトデアラウトカ説シマシタ。日本外相松岡氏が華々シ
ク豪語シテベリリニ何フヤラ日本ノ海空軍部隊が漸次泰國ノ
方ニ移動シツアルヤラテ重大ナル關心ヤ疑惑が存シ居タノハ
言迄モナクデス。

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四月十六日 余、日本大使ト更ニ会談シ重ネテシタ。

余、我が政府が関心有スル最モ重要ナリ前提問題、日本政府が武力ニ依ル征服トイフ現在、主義ヲ潔ク抛棄スル意志トカラ持テ且、我が政府が各國民關係、依ルギ根柢ト見做シナル次、如キ四綱領ヲ採用スルトモ明瞭ナリ事前、保證デアルコトヲ指摘シタ。

- (一) 各國民及凡レ國民、領土、保全及主權ヲ尊重スルコト。
- (二) 他國、内政ニ関シテ不干涉、原則ヲ申サント。
- (三) 商業、機會均等ヲ含ミ、均等主義ヲ申サント。
- (四) 平和的手段ニ依ル現状變更以外、太平洋ニ於ケル現状ヲ攪乱スルト。

余、日本大使ニ我が政府ハ以上、原則ニ沿フ如キモノニバ、日本政府、如何ナル提案モモ喜テ考慮スル旨ヲ傳ヘシタ。

五月十三日、日本大使ハ一般の解決ニ対シ提案ヲ出シシタ。

ソノ提案、要領ハ合衆國ハ將今石ニ日本ト和平交渉ヲスル。梯要請スベキナリ、モシ高麗一州が合衆國、右勸告ヲ受ケ入レトイ場合ニ、合衆國、將政府ハ援助ヲ停止スベキナリ。又日米間正常ナル通商關係ヲ復活スベキナリ、且、合衆國ハ日本ヲ所々南洋西太平洋地域、天然資源——例ヘバ、石油、銅、ニッケルトモ如キ——ヲ開發スル便宜ヲ得ルベシトモテコトデシタ。其地日本、後ニ之ヲ撤回シタガアリビシ、獨立ニ對シ合衆國ト日本、共同保障、要求、無差別待遇ヲ以テスル。合衆國ハ、日本人移住ヲ考慮スベキ要求、及合衆國ト日本、海峽僑民——即チ、戦争、擴大防共並ニ——ニ於ケル平和、迅速ナル解決、要求、梯ヲ條項モアリシタ。

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「十頁」

右提案中「尚日本が三國同盟の遵守スベキトカ確言せらる又
「ソビエト」聯邦、特ニ除外サレタル以外テ當時「ソビエト」戰事或
ハ日支紛争ニ参加シテ本十國ウラ同盟調印國、何カ攻撃ヲ受
ケ場合ニテ援助スベキ日本ノ義務ニ就キ特ニ言及セシテ中ニタ

日本が中國ニ提出シタ和平條件ハ、ハッキリシタ用語ヲ明確ニ規定サ
シナカッタ。然レガウ丹念ニ吟味スルト、ソレハ條件ニ一見何、差障リモ
ナイヤツキアリ又ハ、假面ヲカガタ規約ヲアルカソレニヨリテ日本ハ中國ニ於テ
様々戰略資源、便宜、諸事業、支配ヲ保持シ又表面上ハ共產
主義ニ對スル共同防衛、クシトハテ無期限ニ中國全土及内蒙古ニ於テ
廣範圍、要衝地域ニ日本軍、大部隊ヲ駐屯セシムル權利ヲ獲得セ
トスルニテル事が判明シタ。

コ日本側申出ハ偏狭テ具ニ一方的ナル主張ニテ我々廣範圍、解決
成セシ可能性ヲ見ツク出ス為、出發点トシテ申出ヲ取テクニシタ。
コ解決ハ此國ガ則ツテナル処、原則ニ一致シ線沿テ全太平洋地域ヲ
包括スルモノデシタ。

五月十四日日本外相松岡氏ハ「フル」大使對談際近衛首相ト
余ハ日本、南ヲ進出ハ只第平和的手段ニヨリ遂行サルベキナルト。

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決意ヲト云フガ同代ノ事態ガシラ不可能ナラシメテ限リト意味深
長ニ言フ附加ヘタ。

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ソノ事態トイフハ何ヲ意味シテナルカト大使ノ問ニ答ヘテ松岡
代ハ「イギリス軍ハ「集結」他「イギリス側對策」ニ言及シタ。大使ガ斯
ル對策ハ何レモ防衛的ナモデルトイフト外相ハ日本國民一般ハシラ一般
對策ヲ政府ニ何等クノ行動ヲ取ル事ヲ強ヒル挑発的ナモデルト見
做ミナルト答テタ。

一九四一年五月二十七日「ルーズベルト」大統領ハ國家的超非常時ト事ヲ
宣言シ同日「ラオ」演説テ我々民主主義擁護策ハ總テ我國保全ヲ
計ル事ニ基テナルトイフコトヲ言明シタ。大統領ハ「ヒト」シテ「勝利
ヲ多ク場合ニ發生スルと思ハル事態」就テ警告告シタ。大統領ト余ハ
ソノ宣言ガ「ヒト」シテ「日本軍部將官達」ニテ留意サレタ事ヲ確信
シタル。五月十八日私ハ我々非正式ニ會談カラ日本ト交渉ニ入ル前ニ中國政
府ト胸襟ヲ開キテ「申出」ニ包含サレタル一般事項ニ関シテ「語」合ハ上考
テナルト日本大使ニ話シタ。

引續キニ三週間ノ間ニ種々「点」ヲ明カシ「喰違」ヒラツクスル爲ニ何
回トク會談ガ行ヒタ。我々「繰返シ」次「諸点」ニ関スル我國ノ態
度ヲ説明シタ。即チ合衆國ガ自衛上歐洲戰爭ニ捲込レタ場合ニ於
ケル日本ノ對樞軸關係ヲ明カニスル事、必要ニ他國ノ國內問題ニ對
スル不干渉原則、適用及日本軍、中國領土カラ撤退、中國及「他
太平洋諸地域」ニ於ル通商關係ノ平等原則、適用及太平洋ニ於
ル日本ノ平和意圖ヲ確信スベキ事等、我國ガホテナルモノハ平和手
段トテ物ヲ云フ様ニ廣汎圍ニ協定「モデル」トイフコトヲ協調シタ。

No. 18

日本側ハ五月十二日ニ彼等「申出」ニ對スル完全ナル回答ヲ強要ニ
サタ「ソコ」テ六月二十日大使ハ日本側申出ニ對スル假再成案ノ形式テ

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我國、意向が甚しき。ソノ再成案ニハ、合衆國が自衛上歐洲戰ニ引
込ミテモ日本、合衆國ニ對シテ行動ヲ起ス必要ナシトイフ事ヲハッ
キリセザル爲メ、方法ヲ提議サシテマツ。

中國ニ於ル日本軍駐屯、問題及中國ト日本ト、間、經濟協調、問題
ノ満足ナル解決ヲ成ミトゲル爲メ、尚一層、努力ヲ爲サルベキナルトイフコト
ガ提言サシタ。又合衆國ガ中國政府ニ付スル援助ヲ中止スル意圖ヲ
アルトイフ様ニ提言ハ除去サシテマツ。他種々提言サシタ變更ハ明確化
ノ爲メ至ル我々が述ベテ原則ト提言サシタ解決案ト一致セザル爲メニマ
シタモノアリマツ。